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Victim Impact Evidence in Federal Capital Trials

Fifteen years ago, in Payne v. Tennessee,1 the Supreme Court
lifted its prohibition on the admission of victim impact evidence (VIE) in the penalty phase of capital trials. According
to the Court, admitting evidence on the personal traits of
individual murder victims and the toll associated with their
killings at once properly allowed the government to show
the “uniqueness” of victims, thus counterbalancing defendants’ largely unfettered right to adduce mitigation
evidence, and permitted the sentencing authority to understand the “specific harm” caused by the murder.2
In the wake of Payne, Congress authorized use of VIE
as a nonstatutory aggravating factor, and VIE has become
a staple in federal death penalty trials,3 including those of
Timothy McVeigh and Zacarias Moussaoui. Despite this
prominence, to date no study has been undertaken of VIE
in federal capital trials in particular. In this article, I do so,
analyzing all federal decisions in the Westlaw database
containing victim impact–related claims rendered since
Payne, as well as the statutory and case law concerning
admission of VIE.
I. Payne and the FDPA

In Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court reversed its prior
holdings of only a few years before in Booth v. Maryland4
and South Carolina v. Gathers5 and concluded that the
Eighth Amendment posed no per se bar to the admission
of VIE in capital trials. In the penalty phase of Payne’s
death penalty prosecution for the killings of Charisse
Christopher and her two-year-old daughter Lacie Jo, the
prosecution adduced testimony of Ms. Christopher’s
mother, who related how her grandson Nicholas, who himself had been stabbed and witnessed the gruesome events,
had been emotionally affected by the killings.6 In addition,
in his closing arguments to the jury the prosecutor elaborated on the grandmother’s testimony, offering that
[n]o one will ever know about Lacie Jo because she
never had the chance to grow up. . . . [Nicholas’s]
mother will never kiss him goodnight or pat him as he
goes off to bed, or hold him and sing a lullaby. [Petitioner’s attorney] wants you to think about . . . people
who love the defendant and things about him. He
doesn’t want you to think about the people who loved

Charisse Christopher . . . The people who loved little
Lacie Jo . . . The brother who mourns for her every single day and wants to know where his best little
playmate is. He doesn’t have anybody to watch cartoons with him, a little one. These are the things
that . . . that child will carry forever.7
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In a 6-3 decision, the Court rejected Payne’s contention
that the VIE admitted in his trial violated the Eighth
Amendment. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist first disputed the premise of Booth and Gathers that
“evidence relating to a particular victim or to the harm that
a capital defendant causes a victim’s family” is immaterial
to capital sentencing outcomes.8 Rather, harm traditionally has served as a factor in assessing blameworthiness in
punishment decisions; although “this particular evidence—designed to portray for the sentencing authority
the actual harm caused by a particular crime—is of recent
origin, this fact hardly renders it unconstitutional.”9
According to the Chief Justice, “[v]ictim impact evidence is
simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime
in question, evidence of a general type long considered by
sentencing authorities.”10
Second, precluding VIE “unfairly weighted the scales
in a capital trial,”11 insofar as it “deprive[d] the State of the
full moral force of its evidence and may prevent the jury
from having before it all the information necessary to
determine the proper punishment for a first-degree murder.”12 In order to “‘keep the balance true’” in capital
trials,13 the government cannot be constitutionally barred
from offering a “‘quick glimpse of the life’ which a defendant ‘chose to extinguish’”14 and demonstrating the loss
associated therewith.15
In rescinding its categorical prohibition, the Court
imposed a case-by-case, due process–based admissibility
standard requiring that VIE be barred only when it “is so
unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally
unfair.”16 Furthermore, the Court left intact its holding in
Booth that “a victim’s family members’ characterizations
and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the
appropriate sentence” are still barred by the Eighth
Amendment.17
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Even though Payne refrained from affirmatively
endorsing use of VIE,18 the typically highly emotional
form of evidence has proved enormously popular.19 As
part of its expansion of death-eligible crimes in the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994,20 Congress expressly
approved of VIE in capital trials.21 Section 3593(a) of the
FDPA provides that aggravating evidence “may include
factors concerning the effect of the offense on the victim
and the victim’s family,”22 adding that such evidence may
include “oral testimony, a victim impact statement that
identifies the victim of the offense and the extent and
scope of the injury and loss suffered by the victim and the
victim’s family, and any other relevant information.”23
In the event the sentencing authority unanimously
finds that the government has established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one statutory
aggravating factor,24 VIE, a nonstatutory aggravator,25 can
be considered in capital decisions, presuming adequate
prior notice of intent to admit VIE is provided.26 Unlike
their state court counterparts,27 federal courts with some
frequency have required rather detailed notice of VIE that
the government proposes to use.28 In granting a defense
motion to amend a death notice, for instance, the Northern District of Indiana held that the government must
indicate “who will offer victim impact evidence, the relation the witness is to the victim, the form of testimony
(i.e., written or oral statement) and a summary of the
anticipated testimony.”29 At the same time, however, federal courts have refrained from requiring that the actual
VIE of witnesses be submitted in written form for the
court’s preliminary review and have refused to restrict VIE
ultimately presented by witnesses to such testimony.30
Federal trial courts have at times also evinced concern
over the unique nature of VIE and adopted special procedures. In particular, citing concern over the anticipated
prejudicial nature of VIE, three federal courts have
required a bifurcated sentencing proceeding in which VIE
is to be heard only after the jury determines the threshold
mens rea and statutory aggravating factor requirements.31
II. VIE in the Federal System

Payne and the FDPA plainly allow for the consideration of
VIE in the sentencing phase of capital trials, yet they provide only the most generalized guidance on its
admissibility and use. For its part, the FDPA, while not
governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence,32 requires that
trial courts ensure that the probative value of evidence
(including VIE) is not outweighed by the danger of undue
prejudice.33 The sole constitutional limit prescribed by
Payne, sounding in due process, is that any VIE admitted
not be “so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.”34 In imposing the case-by-case analytic
framework in lieu of Booth’s Eighth Amendment per se
bar against VIE, Payne (the concurring opinions of Justices Souter and O’Connor in particular)35 expressed faith
that trial and appellate courts would vigorously police
admission of VIE.
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This expectation, however, has not translated into successful challenges to VIE. Despite qualifying as what
Judge Richard Matsch, presiding judge in the Timothy
McVeigh capital trial, called “the most problematical of all
the aggravating factors [which] may present the greatest
difficulty in determining the nature and scope of the information to be presented,”36 VIE has proved notably
resistant to successful challenge. During the fifteen years
since Payne, while trial courts have at times acceded to
defense requests to regulate the procedures pertaining to
the admission of VIE,37 and on occasion more substantive
matters,38 not a single appellate court has overturned a
death verdict as a result of impermissible VIE.39
Federal appellate courts either reject claims outright or,
employing Payne’s due process standard, find that that the
VIE was not “so unduly prejudicial that it render[ed] the
trial fundamentally unfair.”40 In applying the open-ended
test, courts often resort to a highly relativistic inquiry,
weighing the VIE against the heinousness of the crime41
or the relative amount of trial time dedicated to the VIE,
with many courts actually counting the number of transcript pages compared to other aggravating as well as
mitigating evidence.42 The Fourth Circuit, for instance,
while noting that the VIE presented had “substantial
impact,” and even conceding arguendo that it exceeded the
“quick glimpse” authorized by Payne, concluded in United
States v. Barnette that in relative terms the VIE did not
“contaminate” the sentencing proceeding as a whole.43
Meanwhile, in the subsequent decision United States v.
Stitt,44 another Fourth Circuit panel used the same
approach in what it denominated as harmless error analysis to condone the government’s violation of the statutory
notice requirement.45
The following provides an overview of the substantive
shape, form, and extent of VIE used today in federal capital trials.
A. Background and Number of VIE Witnesses

The FDPA fails to provide limiting criteria on either the
identity or the number of persons qualified to testify, freeing federal courts to liberally admit VIE. This
expansiveness was most apparent in the trials of Timothy
McVeigh and Zacarias Moussaoui. In McVeigh, the government presented thirty-eight VIE witnesses, including
twenty-six survivors of deceased victims, three persons
injured, one employee of the day care center in the
bombed Murrah Federal Building, and eight rescue and
medical workers.46 While noting that the witnesses were
“significant in number,” the Tenth Circuit lauded the government’s “self-restraint”47 and observed that the volume
“comprised an extremely small percentage of the number
of potential witnesses the government might have called
to testify about the 168 victims who died in the blast and
the impact of the explosion on the numerous injured victims.”48 According to the Tenth Circuit, “[t]he sheer
number of actual victims and the horrific things done to
them necessarily allows for the introduction of a greater
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amount of victim impact testimony in order for the government to show the ‘harm’ caused by the crime.”49
Similarly, in the sentencing phase of the Moussaoui
trial, the government put on over three dozen VIE witnesses, including family and friends, police and
firefighters, and ex-mayor Rudolph Giuliani (the government’s first VIE witness).50 Given that Moussaoui’s
predicate offense involved the deaths of almost three thousand individuals and injuries to countless more, what
might be called the “McVeigh metric” will very likely be
successfully invoked in any subsequent appeal. Payne’s
authorized “quick glimpse of the life [the defendant] chose
to extinguish,”51 it is fair to say, quite clearly assumes modified meaning in the context of mass killings, which, if
future acts of terrorism come to pass, the federal courts
will be obliged to elucidate.52
Federal courts, however, have been inclined to generously admit VIE in more traditional capital trials,
permitting testimony from not just family members, as
provided for in the FDPA,53 but also teachers, neighbors,
school classmates, friends, and coworkers.54 In United
States v. Allen,55 for instance, a capital trial involving the
death of a security guard during a failed armed bank robbery, the government offered eleven VIE witnesses,
including a former coworker, two bank employees, and
the victim’s ex-wife.56 Meanwhile, in United States v. Barnette,57 which involved a prosecution for a double murder,
the government called seven VIE witnesses. Highlighting
further still the mercurial nature of the issue, a federal
court in Massachusetts without elaboration held that the
government could present three or four family members
for each victim in a charged double murder.58
In sum, federal courts evince a distinct reluctance to
limit the number of VIE witnesses and the persons eligible
to provide such information.59 While the Tennessee jury in
Payne itself heard from only the grandmother/mother of
the two victims (with her testimony echoed by the state
prosecutor), federal capital trials today can involve considerably greater numbers of witnesses, without any necessity
of sanguinary connection.60
B. What Qualifies as “Impact”

Likewise, the definitional scope of “impact” has been
noticeably indefinite, with the FDPA again providing only
modest help. By its terms, the FDPA permits VIE that
informs the sentencing authority of “the effect of the
offense on the victim and the victim’s family . . . and the
extent and the scope of the injury and loss suffered by the
victim and the victim’s family, and any other relevant
information.”61 Federal courts, however, have permitted
evidence well beyond the “loss suffered by the victim and
the victim’s family,”62 presumably (yet never expressly)
relying upon the catchall FDPA language “and any other
relevant information.”63 In Moussaoui, for instance, the
government successfully mounted extensive testimony on
the impact on not just family but also friends, coworkers,
rescue personnel, and even New York City’s then mayor,64

as well as the disruptive impact on New York City65 and
the Pentagon.66 In McVeigh, jurors over the course of two
days’ testimony heard extensive testimony from family
and friends,67 as well as gripping evidence on the emotional harms suffered by professional emergency rescue
workers and police.68
Courts have also been amenable to what might be
called “institutional” VIE. For instance, in United States v.
Battle,69 the government successfully mounted testimony
from three prison guards who testified of the impact the
killing of a fellow guard had on the climate of a federal
prison. In upholding its admission, the Eleventh Circuit
deemed the testimony proper because it
told the jury that the harm caused by Battle’s killing of
Officer Washington was not simply to take a life, but
also to embolden other prisoners, to increase the
harassment of guards by prisoners, and to increase the
stresses on prison staff (making them feel less safe) in
the peculiar environment of a prison in which many
inmates are already serving life sentences or long sentences.70
More recently, a federal district court in Kansas tacitly
approved of VIE relating to the impact of the murder of a
local sheriff on the county sheriff’s department and the
people of the county, requiring only that the government
provide additional detail in its notice relative to the proposed VIE.71 In a capital espionage case not involving
deaths, the Eastern District of Virginia rejected a vagueness challenge to VIE associated with “[t]hreats to
national security.”72 According to the court, such threats
“are not obtuse principles, and the potential victims are
clear.”73
By the same token, federal courts have been disinclined to admit VIE concerning victims of any crimes
other than those for which the defendant is being sentenced.74 In United States v. Sampson,75 the District of
Massachusetts expressed concern over the fact that the
FDPA fails to expressly mention such evidence, addressing only VIE on the charged “offense,” and that, even if it
did, the additional VIE would “create too great a risk that
the jury would be influenced by sympathy and passion” in
violation of due process.76
Also, in one of the handful of instances in the study
period in which a trial court found fault with VIE, the
Southern District of New York, in addressing pretrial
motions in the capital prosecution of two individuals for
the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,
curbed government efforts to bifurcate VIE into fatal and
nonfatal outcomes.77 While otherwise deeming the aggravating factors “grave risk of death to additional persons,”
“multiple killings or attempted killings,” and VIE as distinct and nonduplicative, the court found that the
proposed aggravator of “serious injury to surviving victims” was “entirely and wholly subsumed” by the VIE
aggravator.78 While both “function[ed] to provide the jury
with details concerning the widespread human trauma” of
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the bombings, as authorized by Payne,79 the government’s
strategy amounted to an impermissible “attempt to spin
off” aggravators from what “should really only be one.”80
In requiring that the two aggravators be consolidated, the
court added that
what is most problematic is the fact that, because such
parsing of categories serves no evidentiary purpose (since
such evidence would still be admitted under the aegis of
the umbrella aggravator), the sole motivation for doing so
is to ratchet up the number of aggravating factors and
“give the government free rein to trump whatever mitigating factors are raised by the defendant.”81

tions of capital defendants and their crimes and (2) witness opinions of whether death should be imposed.96 In
contrast to the states, where the bans have shown signs of
erosion,97 federal government efforts to admit such testimony has come in for critical scrutiny. In United States v.
Barnard,98 for instance, the jury received written statements from the mother and father of the victim that
provided as follows:
(Mother): “I’m sorry for you, for your heart to be so
hard, you couldn’t even see the innocence of the two
you’ve killed.”
(Father): “I truly believe that . . . our children were tragically and recklessly stolen from us. There was no
profit to be gained, no angry exchange, it was just a
useless act of violence and total disregard of life.”99

C. Victim Traits

Relying upon the FDPA’s general allowance for information “that identifies the victim of the offense,” federal
courts generously admit VIE relating to the personal traits
of victims. In Jones v. United States,82 the Supreme Court
rejected a claim that victim trait–related VIE was duplicative of “victim vulnerability,” another nonstatutory
aggravating factor noticed by the government. According
to the five-member Jones majority, victim vulnerability and
traits are distinct, with the latter serving to inform the jury
of the “victim’s individual uniqueness.”83 According to the
Court, while the “concepts of victim impact and victim
vulnerability may well be relevant in every murder case,
evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case are inherently individualized.”84 Similarly,
Jones rebuffed challenges to VIE sounding in vagueness
and overbreadth,85 as have other courts.86
While federal case law lacks the hugely varied instances
of positive victim traits evidenced in state opinions,87 and
“comparative worth” assessments are checked by the
FDPA’s requirement that jurors certify that the backgrounds of victim and defendant did not influence their
capital decision,88 federal courts are nonetheless predisposed to freely admit victim trait evidence. In United States
v. Hall, for instance, the Fifth Circuit condoned admission
of VIE to the effect that the victim was an aspiring doctor.89
In United States v. Fulks,90 the Fourth Circuit upheld admission of a letter sent by an adult murder victim to her sister,
referring to her determination to recover emotionally from
childhood sexual abuse by her father and to leave an abusive
spouse.91 Meanwhile, in United States v. Bernard,92 the Fifth
Circuit, citing Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Payne
approving of “contextual evidence” relating to victims,93
upheld admission of evidence that the victims were “youth
ministers” who were attending a revival meeting on the day
they were killed.94 Because religion figured centrally in the
victims’ lives, the Bernard court held, “it would be impossible to describe their ‘uniqueness as individual human
beings’ without reference to their faith.”95
D. Opinion Evidence

Finally, federal courts have been vigilant in enforcing
Booth’s remaining prohibition of (1) witness characteriza-
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The Fifth Circuit deemed the statements impermissible
(yet harmless) witness characterization testimony.100
While no decisions in the study involved a challenge to
prosecution witness sentence opinions, one rejected an
effort by the defense to avail itself of anti-death sentiments
among victims’ survivors.101 In United States v. Brown,102
the Eleventh Circuit denied a claim that the government
violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose that a victim’s spouse opposed the death penalty, given that Booth
proscribed admission of such testimony.103
Despite the continued existence of the sentence opinion bar, the Moussaoui trial perhaps signals coming use of
an alternate form of testimony that subtly communicates
opinion testimony—on behalf of the defense. Since Payne,
it has not been uncommon for state courts to uphold
admission of testimony from prosecution witnesses containing thinly veiled pro-death opinions. In one Nevada
capital case, for instance, a surviving spouse urged the
jury to “show no mercy,” which the Nevada Supreme
Court unanimously concluded did not qualify as opinion
but rather amounted to a request that the jury return the
most serious sentence it felt appropriate.104 Similarly, the
Illinois Supreme Court upheld admission of the following
statement offered by the wife of a murdered police officer:
My family and I are very confident that all of you will
return a quick verdict which will send a message to my
children, society, and the law enforcement community
that we simply will not tolerate or accept our last
means of protection being annihilated on our streets.
Renew our faith in the criminal justice system and
bring a phase of closure to this ongoing nightmare that
fills our lives.105
In Moussaoui, the defense sought to turn this ambiguity to its own advantage by calling twenty-four survivors of
the 9/11 tragedy.106 Although not allowed to specify
whether they favored death or not, the witnesses spoke of
their recovery since 9/11, used terms such as “compassion” and “respect for life,”107 and testified with limited
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emotion (as compared to the government’s VIE witnesses).108 One survivor, whose son died in the World
Trade Center, calmly spoke of how he had tried to channel
the “mixture of rage, murderous rage, and also deep feelings of sadness” he felt. “I had a choice of staying with
these feelings or sort of nurturing them. I tried to think of
ways that I could learn more. I felt the need for bridges of
understanding with people who could do this kind of
thing.”109 Another survivor, who lost his father in the
World Trade Center attacks, offered that “I saw that if I
had let myself succumb to the fear and anger and
vengeance, then more than the planes would have been
hijacked that day.”110
It remains to be seen whether other federal courts will
be similarly receptive to such testimony111 or, like state
courts, will reject defense efforts to avail themselves of
survivor VIE testimony.112 Either way, it is likely that federal (and state) courts increasingly will be pressed to
elucidate the bounds of permissible “opinion” VIE.113
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III. Conclusion

As the foregoing makes clear, today federal courts admit
VIE of a quality and degree far in excess of Payne’s envisaged “quick glimpse of the life defendant[s] chose to
extinguish.”114 This tendency is most vividly apparent in
capital prosecutions for mass killings, such as McVeigh and
Moussaoui, the tragic scope of which naturally presses the
bounds of both “victim” and “impact.” Yet, as shown above,
with the meager limits imposed by the FDPA and Payne as
a backdrop, federal courts also liberally admit VIE in more
typical capital cases. And, despite notice requirements and
increasing use of preliminary judicial review, the emotionally potent evidence is merely thrown into the decisional
mix for capital jurors,115 without benefit of a pattern jury
instruction in any circuit,116 with the sole constitutional
caveat being that the VIE not be so unduly prejudicial “that
it render[s] the trial fundamentally unfair.”117
In turn, as this study of the case law over the fifteen
years since Payne shows, trial and appellate courts have
been disinclined to find fault with VIE. While in a number
of instances trial courts reined in government efforts to
use VIE, almost always finding fault with procedural
aspects such as notice, to date no federal appellate court
has deemed admitted VIE to be reversible error. It is now
apparent, as Payne would have it, that VIE is “simply
another form or method of informing the sentencing
authority” in federal capital trials.118 Just as death is no
longer seen as quite so “different” a penalty than once purported for juristic purposes,119 neither is VIE, leading to a
symmetric use of the emotionally potent form of evidence
in capital and noncapital trials alike.120 What this means
for future capital trials in the federal system remains to be
seen.
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Notes
1
2

501 U.S. 808 (1991).
Id. at 821, 826.

See United States v. Sampson, 332 F. Supp. 2d 325, 338 (D.
Mass. 2004) (noting that victim impact evidence has become
a “regular, legitimate feature” of federal capital trials).
482 U.S. 496 (1987).
490 U.S. 805 (1989).
Payne, 501 U.S. at 814-15.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 821.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 827 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
122 (1934)).
Id. at 822 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397
(1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 830.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 830 n.2.
Id. at 827 (“We thus hold that if the State chooses to permit
the admission of victim evidence . . . the Eighth Amendment
erects no per se bar.”); id. at 831 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“We do not hold today that victim impact evidence must be
admitted, or even that it should be admitted.”).
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. In addition to being
a mainstay of federal capital trials, VIE is permitted in thirtyfive of the thirty-eight capital states and the military. Kenji
Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835, 1869
(2005). For additional discussion of the popularity of VIE, as
well as the reasons inspiring its rapid proliferation, see
Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses
and Abuses of Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ.
L. REV. 143 (1999) [hereinafter Logan, Past Darkly].
Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796, 1959 (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
See United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1491 (D.
Colo. 1996) (recognizing that § 3593(a) “specifically contemplates the use of victim impact evidence as an aggravating
factor”).
18 U.S.C. § 3593(a).
Id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a), (e).
See United States v. Davis, 912 F. Supp. 938, 947 (E.D. La.
1996) (characterizing VIE as a nonstatutory aggravator in
federal capital proceedings).
Such notice is required unless the government’s evidence is
“used merely to rebut mitigating evidence offered by the
defendant.” United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166,
186-87 (D. Mass. 2004).
See Logan, Past Darkly, supra note 19, at 151-52.
See United States v. Taylor, 316 F. Supp. 2d 730, 743 (N.D.
Ind. 2004); United States v. O’Driscoll, 203 F. Supp. 2d 334,
340-41 (M.D. Pa. 2002); United States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp.
2d 90, 111 (U.S.D.C. 2000); United States v. Glover, 43 F.
Supp. 2d 1217, 1234-36 (D. Kan. 1999). See also United
States v. Rodriguez, No. 2:04-CR-55, 2006 WL 435581
(D.N.D. Feb. 21, 2006) (noting parties’ agreement that government will provide defense “with the names of the
witnesses and outlines of their testimony”); United States v.
Johnson, 136 F. Supp. 2d 553, 561 (W.D. Va. 2001) (requiring
government to amend its notice to amplify its initial statement that it was merely to present evidence on the
nonstatutory aggravator of “Victim Impact”).
Taylor, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 743. See also Cooper, 91 F. Supp.
2d at 111 (ordering government to amend its notice to
include “more specific information concerning the extent and
scope of the injuries and loss suffered by each victim, his or
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her family members, and other relevant individuals, and as to
each victim’s ‘personal characteristics’”).
See, e.g., United States v. Caro, 433 F. Supp. 2d 726, 730
(E.D. Va. 2006) (rejecting defense motion for pretrial judicial
review); United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 906
(E.D. Va. 2005) (rejecting defense motion, noting that “[t]here
is no statutory requirement that the Court conduct such a preview”); United States v. Edelin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 59, 79 (D.D.C.
2001) (rejecting preliminary review). But see United States v.
Williams, No. S100CR.1008 (NRB), 2004 WL 2980027 *23
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying defense motion to compel a written
statement describing the testimony of each VIE witness the
government intended to call, while preserving opportunity for
future “motion to discover” at end of guilt phase).
See United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 936, 957 (S.D.
Ohio 2005); United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043,
1106 (N.D. Iowa 2005); United States v. Davis, 912 F. Supp.
938, 949 (E.D. La. 1996).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (providing that “[i]nformation is
admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials.”).
Id.
Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
Id. at 831 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 836 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
United States v. McVeigh, 958 F. Supp. 512, 513 (D. Colo.
1997). See also United States v. Gilbert, 120 F. Supp. 2d 147,
149 (D. Mass. 2000) (“Congress has not provided specific
guidelines for the admissibility of [VIE]. Rather, it has
entrusted trial judges with both substantial responsibility and
with broad discretion to act as guardians of the sentencing
process.”).
See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 290, 300-01
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (requiring that fatal and nonfatal injuries to
victims be consolidated into a single umbrella VIE factor);
Sampson, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 192-93 (excluding twenty-sevenminute video chronicling the victim’s life set to poignant
music and VIE relating to murder for which defendant is not
being sentenced); United States v. O’Driscoll, No. 4: CR-01277, 2003 WL 1401973 *2 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (requiring that
government redact letter containing survivors’ characterizations of defendant and murders, as prohibited by Booth). In
addition, although not revealed as part of the study’s Westlaw queries, Judge Matsch in the McVeigh trial, while not
granting defense requests to undertake a preliminary hearing
on proposed VIE, exercised considerable control, barring testimony regarding the deaths of nineteen children, the
conditions of victims’ bodies, funeral arrangements, holiday
photos of victims, and a video of a typical day in the Murrah
Building credit union (where six victims worked). John
Gibeaut, The Last Word: Jury Is Still Out on Impact Evidence,
A.B.A. J. 42, 43 (Sept. 1997).
The study involved a Westlaw search of all decisions (unpublished and published) issued from 1991 through July 2006.
To ensure capture of all available data, both the relevant
Westlaw key number and “victim impact” queries were used.
Because understanding of the use of VIE in federal capital
trials in particular was sought, decisions on claims brought
by state habeas petitioners were excluded.
Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
See United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 405 (5th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 832 (O’Connor, J., concurring))
(“We are confident that [the VIE] did not inflame [the jury’s]
passions more than did the facts of the crime.”). To this, Justice Stevens responded in his Payne dissent that
[w]e should not be concerned with the cases in which victim impact evidence will not make a difference. We should
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be concerned instead with the cases in which it will make
a difference. In those cases, defendants will be sentenced
arbitrarily to death on the basis of evidence that would
not otherwise be admissible because it is irrelevant to the
defendant’s moral culpability.
Id. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Eighth and Fourth Circuits have been especially partial to
this approach. See United States v. Nelson, 347 F.3d 701,
713-14 (8th Cir. 2003) (condoning VIE because it was provided by only six witnesses and consumed 101 of 1,100
pages of trial transcript and was offset by defense mitigation
evidence); Barnette, 211 F.3d at 818 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting
that the VIE consumed only 22 percent of the government’s
case in aggravation and that testimony from defendant’s family consumed 41 percent of the mitigation case).
Barnette, 211 F.3d at 818.
250 F.3d 878 (4th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 898-99. For discussion of the risks presented by “quantitative” harmless error analysis relative to VIE in capital
trials, see Logan, Past Darkly, supra note 19, at 185-90.
United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1216 (10th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1007 (1999). For further detail
on the VIE witnesses and varieties of impact offered at
McVeigh’s trial, as surveyed by McVeigh’s trial counsel, see
Richard Burr, Litigating with Victim Impact Testimony: The
Serendipity That Has Come from Payne v. Tennessee, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 521-25 (2003).
McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1221.
Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1221.
Jerry Markon & Timothy Dwyer, Horror Takes the Stand at the
Moussaoui Trial, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2006, at A1.
Payne, 501 U.S. at 831.
Two other less high-profile federal trials also involved significant numbers of witnesses—the trial of Terry Nichols, for his
involvement in the Oklahoma City bombing (fifty-five VIE witnesses), and Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali, for his
involvement in the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in
Nairobi, Kenya, in which 213 individuals were killed (twentysix VIE witnesses). For discussion of these trials, see Wayne
A. Logan, Pathos and Punishment: The Use of Victim Impact
Evidence in Mass Killing Prosecutions (manuscript on file with
author).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a).
See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 347 F.3d 701, 713 (8th Cir.
2003) (teacher, neighbor, and classmate); United States v.
Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 478 (5th Cir. 2002) (friend and former coworker); United States v. Holder, 247 F.3d 741, 779
(8th Cir. 2001) (coworker and former coworker); United
States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 995 (8th Cir. 2000) (coworker).
247 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 779.
211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000).
United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 189 (D.
Mass. 2004).
States have been similarly averse to placing numeric limits
on VIE, with only a few imposing a limit. See Commonwealth
v. Terry, 153 S.W.3d 794, 805 (Ky. 2005) (limiting prosecutor
to one VIE witness); State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 180
(N.J. 1996) (limiting prosecution to one VIE witness absent
exceptional circumstances). Likewise, only rarely have states
seen fit to specify who can provide VIE. See Logan, Past
Darkly, supra note 19, at 154 n.63 (citing laws in Delaware,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Oklahoma).
This breadth, it bears mention, differs from the narrower
approach to defining “victim” in noncapital cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Terry, 142 F.3d 702, 710-12 (4th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting sentence increase under Guidelines for involuntary
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manslaughter conviction based on “extreme psychological
impact” on survivors because there was “no evidence that the
families in question had any relationship to the offense
beyond their relationship to the direct victims”).
18 U.S.C. § 3593(a).
Notably, Payne itself variously refers to the harms caused a
“victim’s family” and the “loss to the victim’s family and to
society.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 819, 822. See also id. at 835
(Souter, J., concurring) (“information revealing the individuality
of the victim and the impact of the crime on the victim’s survivors”); id. at 830 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“impact on the
victim’s family and community”). More recently, in United
States v. Jones, 527 U.S. 373 (1999), the Court characterized
VIE as addressing the “emotional impact of the murder on the
victim’s family” and the “effect of the crime on her family.” Id.
at 395, 399. See also id. at 401 (noting that “every murder will
have an impact on the victim’s family and friends”).
18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). Again, only a handful of states have
specified what can be deemed “impact.” See Logan, Past
Darkly, supra note 19, at 162 n.115 (noting, inter alia, Mississippi’s law limiting impact to “the financial, emotional and
physical effects of the crime on the victim and the victim’s
family”).
See supra note 50.
The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Moussaoui
caused “tremendous disruption to the function of the City of
New York and its economy,” as evidenced by inter alia: the
deaths of state and federal employees; the loss of buildings,
vehicles, and weapons; disruption of communications and
transportation systems; the closure of parks, playgrounds,
and schools; the displacement of and economic harm to
businesses; property losses costing several billon dollars;
and the delay in the meeting of the UN and a special meeting
of the UN “called to address UNICEF issues.” United States
v. Moussaoui, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, No. 01-455-A, Special Verdict Form for Phase II, at
3-5, May 3, 2006.
The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Moussaoui
caused “tremendous disruption to the function of the Pentagon,” as evidenced by inter alia: destruction of several
military centers and the loss of a majority of their respective
staffs; the destruction and damage to hundreds of thousands
of square feet of office space; the destruction of a part of
the Pentagon that had been recently renovated at a cost of
$250 million; and destruction of equipment specifically
designed for the Pentagon “because of its unique role as the
center” of U.S. military operations. Id. at 5.
McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1219-20.
Scott Robinson, Editorial, Stacking the Deck: Heart-Wrenching
“Victim Impact” Statements Make It Virtually Impossible for
Jurors to Set Emotions Aside, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 8, 1997,
at 1B.
173 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1348 n.6. But see United Sates v. Quinones, No. 00
CR.761 (JSR), 2004 WL 1234044 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (demurring
on the question of the admissibility of “‘institutional’” VIE,
“i.e., the impact that the defendants’ alleged crimes had on
the New York Police Department”).
United States v. Cheever, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1211 (D.
Kan. 2006).
United States v. Regan, 228 F. Supp. 2d 742, 752 (E.D. Va.
2002).
Id.
Similarly, states typically permit VIE relative only to the
offense(s) being tried. North Carolina, however, represents an
exception. See State v. Robinson, 451 S.E.2d 196, 204-05
(N.C. 1994) (permitting VIE from child of a woman the defendant had murdered several years earlier).

75
76
77

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

87
88
89
90
91

92
93

94
95

96
97

98
99
100
101

102
103
104
105

106

107

335 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004).
Id. at 193 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)).
United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 290, 300
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
527 U.S. 373 (1999).
Id. at 399.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 400-401.
See, e.g., United States v. Bourgeois, 423 F.3d 501, 510-11
(5th Cir. 2001). Likewise, in Webster v. United States, 162
F.3d 308, 324 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit rejected the
claim that VIE was duplicative of the “especially heinous,
cruel, and depraved” statutory aggravating factor.
See Logan, Past Darkly, supra note 19, at 157-59.
18 U.S.C. § 3593(f).
United States v. Hall, 152 F. 3d 381, 405 (5th Cir. 1998).
454 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 2006).
According to the panel, the letter “highlighted struggles [the
victim] had faced in her life and the strength with which she
confronted them.” Id. at 436. At the same time, the victim’s
history of sexual abuse and determination to avoid further
abuse possibly provided jurors with a sense of heightened
harm, because the victim “suffered all the more” as a result
of the sexual abuse perpetrated by the defendant. Id.
299 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 479 (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 842 (Souter, J., concurring)).
Id.
Id. (citation omitted). By the same token, reflecting the
stance of state courts, the Eastern District of Virginia
rejected an argument that defendants did not deserve death
because their murder victims were alleged drug dealers.
United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 804, 822 (E.D. Va.
1997).
See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2.
See Wayne A. Logan, Victims, Survivors, and the Decisions to
Seek and Impose Death, in WOUNDS THAT DO NOT BIND: VICTIMBASED PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH PENALTY 161, 166-68 (James
R. Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006); Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Sentence Recommendations in Capital
Trials, 41 B.C. L. REV. 517, 528-33 (2000) [hereinafter Logan,
Opining on Death].
299 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 480.
Id. at 480-81.
For discussion of the varied opinions on capital punishment
and the reluctance of courts to admit them, either at the
charging or sentence decision-making stage, see Wayne A.
Logan, Declaring Life at the Crossroads of Death: Victims’ AntiDeath Penalty Views and Prosecutors’ Charging Decisions, 18
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41, 44-45 (1999) [hereinafter Declaring Life].
441 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1352.
Witter v. State, 921 P.2d 886, 895-96 (Nev. 1996).
People v. Williams, 692 N.E.2d 1109, 1124 (Ill. 1998). The
Tennessee prosecutor’s closing argument in Payne itself, see
text accompanying note 7, provides another example of notso-veiled opinion.
Neil A. Lewis & David Stout, At Sentencing, Moussaoui Is Defiant, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2006.
Timothy Dwyer & Jerry Markon, For Victims’ Families, Verdict
Elicits Mix of Shock, Relief, WASH. POST, May 4, 2006. A similar instance occurred in a Florida capital trial, where a
survivor and death penalty opponent was threatened with
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contempt if she expressed her opinion. On the stand, she
referred to the defendant as a “gentleman” and signaled her
opposition by noting that she worked as a death penalty abolitionist. Tom Jicha, The Risk of Forgiveness: On 48 Hours,
Mercy Raises Troubling Questions, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 2, 1997, at 3E.
Jerry Markon & Timothy Dwyer, Moussaoui Gets Some Unusual
Help; Some 911 Relatives Testify for the Defense, WASH. POST,
Apr. 20, 2006, at A10.
Id.
Id.
For discussion of this strategy more generally, see Adrienne
N. Barnes, Reverse Impact Testimony: A New and Improved Victim Impact Statement, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 245 (2002).
Logan, Declaring Life, supra note 101, at 44.
See Logan, Opining on Death, supra note 97, at 526-29, 54547 (discussing the enduring ambiguity over the continued
vitality of the sentence opinion testimony bar, complicated by
its close resemblance to similar testimony that is admissible,
such as prosecutorial opinions on whether death is warranted
and defense “pleas for mercy”).
Payne, 501 U.S. at 822.
Highlighting this, in the government’s closing argument in the
Moussaoui case prosecutor David Raskin urged that jurors
mark the VIE block on their verdict form with an exclamation
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point. Phil Hirschkorn, Jury Deliberation Begins in 9/11 Trial,
cnn.com, Apr. 24, 2006.
For an example of a jury instruction created by a district
court, see United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166,
189-91 (D. Mass. 2004). For examples of state pattern VIE
instructions, see, e.g., Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 828
(Okla. Crim. App. 1995); Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d
143, 159 (Pa. 2001).
Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
Id.; see also id. at 827 (“There is no reason to treat [VIE] differently than [how] other relevant evidence is treated.”).
See Wayne A. Logan, Casting New Light on an Old Subject:
Death Penalty Abolitionism for a New Millennium, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1336, 1342-43 (2002) (discussing various ways in which
this distinctiveness has diminished). See also Carol S. Steiker
& Jordan S. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulations of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 397 (1995) (“close examination
of the Court’s decisions . . . reveals that the procedural safeguards in death cases are not as different as one might
expect . . . [The Court often] has relegate[d] capital defendants to the same level of protection as non-capital
defendants.”).
See Booth, 482 U.S. at 516-17 (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s ban of VIE in capital yet not noncapital trials).
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